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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the way in which the South African judiciary approaches the 
interpretation of fiscal legislation. It refers back to the use of the literal/textual 
approach (traditional approach), its short comings and the modification of such 
approach if it leads to absurdity. It also explores the purposive and contextual 
approaches to the interpretation of fiscal statutes. It then analyses whether the advent 
of the Constitution (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996) has 
brought a paradigm shift from the strict literal approach to the purposive approach. 
The conclusion reached is that the Constitution has been a catalyst for change from 
the literal/textual approach to a purposive approach. However, the conclusion does 
not shy away from showing that, in practice; there is a continued practical 
application of the literal/textual approach by South African courts. Moreover, it was 
concluded that there is an ‘interpretation game’ where judges uses their common 
sense in reaching their decisions rather than these rules of interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Tax is an everyday reality of life and there is scarcely an economic act devoid of tax 
consequences.1 It was once said, ‘a taxing statute provides for the lawful 
‘‘confiscation’’ of an amount of the taxpayers’ property in the form of money.’2 
What make taxpayers keep paying tax are their obligations under taxing statutes. 
However this does not mean that everything is rosy; even roses have thorns. The way 
in which the ‘message of legality’ is conveyed to the public by the judiciary differs 
from one judge to another. This has from time to time raised jurisprudential 
eyebrows when it comes to how fiscal statutes should be interpreted. Many questions 
have been raised about the approach that the judiciary uses or should use to interpret 
fiscal legislation. 
One of the foundations of a liberal idea of the law is the fallacy that law is 
neutral, certain and objective.3 The South African law of statutory interpretation 
continues to be characterised by inconsistency and uncertainty.4 If each and every 
provision of a statute possessed certainty, a virtue often ascribed to statute law, there 
would be no room for its interpretation or, as it is also called, construction. There is, 
however, particularly in taxation matters, hardly a case where the courts, when 
dealing with statutory provisions, are not faced with the task of interpreting them.5 
Interpretation, in the context of fiscal legislation, is the cornerstone on which the 
revenue authorities assess and collect taxes and, correspondingly, the foundation 
upon which the taxpayers` rights are built.6  
South African tax laws are ‘older’ statutes and have no built-in interpretation 
provisions. It accordingly rests with the courts to apply the common law rules of 
interpretation at their disposal to maintain them as relevant tools for determining how 
                                                
1 Trevor S Emslie, Dennis M Davis and SJ Hutton Income Tax Cases and Material 3ed (2001)1 
2 Robert C Williams Income Tax in South Africa: Law and Practice 4ed (2006) 2, see also TS Emslie et al 
Income Tax Cases and Material 3ed (2001) 16 
3 Christa Rautenbach Rautenbach Christa, van Rensburg Linda Jansen and Venter F Politics, Socio-
Economic Issues and Culture in Constitutional Adjudication (2004) 21 
4 Fanyana ka Mdumbe ‘Has the literal/Intentional/Textual Approach to Statutory Interpretation been Dealt 
the Coup de Grace at Last?’ Bato Star Fishing Pty Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 7 BCLR 
687 (CC): Case Note (2004) 19 2 SA Publiekreg 472-481 at 472 
5 David Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) 3.2 para 3.1 
6 George K Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 107, see also George Goldswain ‘Winds 
of Change: Strict and Literal Rule’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 17-19 at 17 
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tax laws should be applied.7 The main aim of fiscal statute interpretation is to 
ascertain the intention of the legislature, as indeed it is with all other legislation. This 
is typically done by employing the rules of interpretation which can be encapsulated 
are, chiefly, under the following headings: the literal/textual approach, the 
purposive/contextual approach and Constitutional interpretation. This essay will 
demonstrate that the courts have established another approach to interpretation, 
namely the ‘common sense approach’ to interpretation of fiscal legislation. 
South African judicial officers and tax practitioners involved in day-to-day 
construction of fiscal statutes, as are  legal academics researching and teaching either 
Interpretation of Statutes as an academic discipline or disciplines significantly reliant 
on statutory interpretation ( in this case tax law), have not yet devoted earnest 
attention to the systematization of the canons of statutory interpretation.8 This 
accounts for the lack of a clearly and explicitly recognised system for the 
classification of these rules of interpretation to ensure certainty, legitimacy and 
stability.9 If a single approach is not adopted in South Africa, disputes over tax issues 
are likely to remain a permanent feature of its tax system. 
It is well known that the interpretation of fiscal statutes is not characterised 
by unique rules of interpretation. The rules which might at first sight appear to be 
special rules of interpretation applicable to fiscal statutes are in reality nothing more 
than the application of general principles of interpretation to tax enactments.10 These 
rules have no independent life of their own in relation to tax law, and are rooted in 
the rules of statutory interpretation common to all branches of the law.11 So, fiscal 
statutes are not a specially privileged category of legislation and must be approached 
and dealt in the same manner as other statutes. 
In the realm of taxation, legal interpretation is a creative act that ends in an 
effort to persuade others to accept one’s meanings. The practice of persuasion differs 
from time to time and from culture to culture.12 This paper, backed by case law, will 
                                                
7 Theuns Steyn ‘Tax Laws: Old Rules, New Tools’ (2009) 9 5 Without Prejudice 6-7 at 6 
8 Lourence Du Plessiss ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Cannons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretation’ 
(2005) 122 3 SALJ 591-613 at 591 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid TS Emslie et al at 17 
11 Ibid 
12 Robert  Benson The Interpretation Game: How judges and Lawyers Make the Law (2008) xv 
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refer to the dicta of the most influential judges of various times in South African tax 
law jurisprudence. 
This paper proceeds with a discussion about the historical background of 
fiscal statute interpretation and interpretation in general. This will be followed by an 
investigation of the rationale behind studying the interpretation of fiscal statutes. At 
the core of this paper lies the discussion, in depth, of various rules of interpretation 
and their applicability in the Republic. This discussion will also encompass the 
impact of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa13 on the interpretation of 
fiscal statutes. Interestingly, a discussion (the naked truth) about the interpretation 
game played by judges in influencing fiscal interpretation and shaping the way they 
think tax law can be construed follows. Finally, this essay will be enveloped by a 
conclusion. 
1.1 Background Context of the Study 
‘The life of law has not been logic: it has been experience.’14 The history of 
interpretation of fiscal statutes dates back to the use of the traditional literal approach 
which stipulates that if the words of the statute were clear, they have to be put into 
effect. Prior 1994, South African statutory interpretation was strongly influenced by 
English law and it still is in certain respects. The literal approach to statutory 
interpretation extends back to the case of Waghan v Anon15 where an English judge 
in 1340 stated that, ‘we cannot carry the statute further than the words of it say.’ 
South African courts followed the dicta posed in the famous Partington vs. 
Attorney-General case16 where Lord Cairns observed that, ‘if a person sought to be 
taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship 
may appear to be on the judiciary mind.’17 It also follows the English case Cape 
Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners18 where Rowlatt J posed a 
groundbreaking dictum which will be discussed below. 
                                                
13 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 hereafter referred to as ‘the Constitution.’ 
14 OW Holmes Jr The Common Law (1881) 1, see also OW Holmes Jr ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 
Harvard Law Review 457 
15 Waghan v Anon [1346] Year Book 20 Edward III, ii 198 
16 [1869] L.R. 4 H.L 100 
17 at 122 
18 [1921 ] 1 K.B 64 
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The Appellate Division in CIR v Simpson19 quoted the above dictum with 
approval and for some time, the strict and literal rule was used as the guiding 
principle in interpretation of fiscal legislation by the judiciary. These early decisions 
of the Appellate Division tended to create the impression that fiscal legislation 
should be interpreted differently to other legislation- strictly as opposed to attempting 
to establish the purpose of the legislature. 20 However, almost 20 years after the 
Simpson case, Botha JA in Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR21 rejected 
the notion that fiscal legislation should be interpreted differently to other 
legislation.22 
The strict approach had been maintained for many years both in South Africa 
and other jurisdictions, but it has been ameliorated as later decisions found 
irregularities within it.23 In Savage v CIR24, Shreiner JA pointed out that, although 
the principle (literal rule) is clear, the problem is that of application.25 
Some judges of the Appellate Division, as it then was, moved away from the 
textual/literal approach because, according to them, the intention of the legislature 
was not to be ascertained only by reference to the ipssima verba used in the 
legislation concerned, but also with reference to the broader context.26 The 
purposive/contextual approach was adopted to curb the inadequacies of the literal 
rule and it sought to ascertain the intention of the legislature by reading an Act as a 
whole and placing in context the ends sought to be achieved (the purpose).27  
Post 1994, South African statutory interpretation is heavily influenced by the 
Constitution. It is interesting that the Constitution brought a paradigm shift in the 
                                                
19 1949 (4) SA 678 (A) 
20 GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 109 
21 37 SATC 319 
22 At page 334 he stated that the decisive and overriding principle to be used when interpreting fiscal 
legislation is no different from that applicable in the interpretation of all legislation. See also GK 
Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of Change’ 
(2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 109 
23 Jonathan Silke ‘The Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation- Cannons of Construction, Recent Judicial 
Comments and New Approaches’ (1995) Acta Juridica 123-168 at 124 
24 18 SATC 1 
25 Savage v CIR 18 SATC 1 at 9 
26 Fanyana ka Mdumbe ‘Has the literal/Intentional/Textual Approach to Statutory Interpretation been 
Dealt the Coup de Grace at Last?’ Bato Star Fishing Pty Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 7 
BCLR 687 (CC): Case Note (2004) 19 2 SA Publiekreg 472-481 at 473 
27 Ibid GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ Meditari Accountancy Research (2008) 107-121 at 111 
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way in which legislation should be interpreted. The pre-1994 era was characterised 
by the Westminster doctrine of parliamentary supremacy or sovereignty. 
Parliamentary sovereignty entails that neither the courts nor another body have the 
power to review or strike down oppressive or ultra vires legislation enacted by 
Parliament.  
According to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, whatever the 
Parliament enacted was the law and it did not matter whether the legislation violated 
or infringed a person’s common law rights or other rights. The Westminster system 
and all its institutions remained intact until the Interim Constitution was promulgated 
in 1994.28 With the Interim Constitution marking the democratic dispensation, much 
weight was given to the current Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa of 1996, which is the supreme law of the land.29 The Constitutional 
dispensation ousted the Westminster doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty with 
constitutional supremacy.30 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The South African judiciary is often unpredictable about its course with 
regard to the interpretation of fiscal statutes. There is often uncertainty in South 
African courts when it comes to the approaches to be used in interpretation of tax 
legislation and to deal with ambiguity. It appears that there is some hesitancy in 
judges to move away from the traditional literal approach and to apply the purposive 
approach as a real alternative.31 It has been suggested that the unique features of tax 
laws, including its high level of detail, frequent revision, and largely self-contained 
nature, require a special set of interpretive tools and approach,32 but this is open to 
question. 
 
                                                
28 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 which came into effect on the 
27 April of 1994 
29 Section 2 of the Constitution 
30 See G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change III: The Constitution- A catalyst for Change’ (2009) 23 Tax 
Panning 69-71 at 69, see also In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) 
in para 194 
31 E-Statute ‘The Literal and Purposive Approach to Interpretation in Respect to Taxation Legislation’ 
(2011) Available at http://statutelaw.blogspot.com/2011/03/1-literal-and-purposive-approach-to.html 
[Accessed on 10 June 2011] 
32 A Srivastava ‘Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes’ Available at  
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/infs.htm. [Accessed on 25 May 2011] 
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1.3  Research Questions 
a. Literal vs. Purposive approach: which approach does the South African 
judiciary apply when interpreting fiscal statutes? Is there order of primacy? 
b. Interpretation or misinterpretation: How do South African courts deal with 
ambiguity in fiscal statutes? 
c. Has the Constitution influenced or changed the way in which legislations 
(including fiscal legislation) are interpreted? If so, what is the approach 
brought by the change or such influence? 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERPRETATION OF FISCAL STATUTES 
2.1. Introduction 
Interpretation of statutes (including fiscal statutes) deals with the body of rules and 
principles which are used to construct the correct meaning of legislative provisions to 
be applied in practical situations.33 Since all taxes are imposed by statute, all 
questions of tax are ultimately ones that involve the interpretation and application of 
the statute.34 Tax lawyers always had to grapple with the interpretation of tax 
statutes. An important role of tax lawyers is to advise their clients as to the likelihood 
that a contemplated return35 position will be upheld in litigation.36 A lawyer advising 
on a proposed transaction that will give rise to tax consequences in a certain 
jurisdiction needs to understand how the courts in that jurisdiction are likely to 
react.37 
Statute law is the will of the Legislature; and the object of all judicial 
interpretation of it is to determine what intention is ither expressly or by implication 
conveyed by the language used, so far as it is necessary for the purpose of 
determining whether a particular case or state of facts which is presented to the 
interpreter falls within it.38 
2.2. The Rationale behind the Interpretation of fiscal statutes 
No government body interferes more in the private affairs of individuals than the 
South African Revenu  Authority (SARS). Virtually, as Goldswain noted, every 
provision in the Income Tax Act, prima facie, interferes with a person’s fundamental 
rights as embodied in the Bill of Rights.39 It has been mentioned above that, South 
African courts had been strongly influenced by English law in interpreting fiscal 
legislation. Like their English counterparts, the courts viewed their function in 
interpreting statutes to be to ascertain the intention of the legislature as express or 
                                                
33 Jacques De Ville ‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373-389 at 374, see also 
Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 3ed (1998) 2 
34 John Avery Jones, Peter Harris and David Oliver Comparative Perspectives on Revenue Law: Essays in 
Honour of John Tiley (2008) 8 
35 That is, the manner in which it is proposed to report a planned transaction on the tax return 
36 Victor Thuronyi Comparative Tax Law (2003) 133 
37 Ibid at 133 
38 Peter Benson Maxwell On the Intrpretation of statutes (1875) 1 
39 Ibid GK Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 118, see also Goldswaine 
‘Winds of Change-V: Concluding Issues’ (2009) 23 Tax Planning 98-99 at 98 
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implied in the legislation concerned and then to give effect to that intention and to 
protect the rights of both, revenue authorities and the taxpayer.40 
There are myriad reasons why the subject of fiscal interpretation is very 
significant. Statutes are complex and difficulty subjects, they tend to mix legal and 
technical subject-matter. Most are drafted by more than one draftsman, sometimes 
resulting in incoherence.41 Statutes anticipate the future and often use indeterminate 
terms. Words are an imprecise way of communication, they can have different 
meanings, the duty is cast upon the courts to determine the ‘appropriate’ 
interpretation or meaning thereof.42 
Botha reiterated that, ‘the written and spoken word are imperfect renderings 
of human thought, and in the case of legislation.... courts are obliged to use specific 
rules of interpretation to construe the meaning legislations.’43 The aim of 
interpretation is to discover the correct meaning of the words used and, for Botha, the 
original meaning of a word is lost in the linguistic act and which has to be recaptured 
through the aid of the rules of interpretation.44 
Fiscal statutes are voluminous and complex and some of them have been 
repeatedly amended45  over a long period of time.46 Tax statutes are too long, too 
obscure, and they are becoming longer, more obscure and more complex.47 There is a 
need to be well equipped about the know-how of how to interpret them. The bright 
minds of the tax court judges must be blessed with the wisdom of interpretation, so 
that they can be able to articulate, without anomalies, what was meant and intended 
by the sculptors of the Acts, the Legislature.  
Interpretation of fiscal statutes is also important in that it seeks to address the 
issue of ambiguity. If legislation is ambiguous, the rules of interpretation enlighten a 
                                                
40 Ibid Fanyana ka Mdumbe (2004) 19 2 SA Publiekreg 472-481 at 473 
41 Wikipedia ‘Purposive Rule’ Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/purposive_rule [Accessed on 27 
June 2011] 
42 Ibid 
43 Christo Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 3ed (1998) 2, see also J De Ville 
‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373-389 at 374 
44 J De Ville ‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373-389 at 374 
45 The first Income Tax Act of South Africa was the Cape Additional Taxation Act 36 of 1904 and it was 
repealed by various other Acts until to the current Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, see also D Meyerowitz 
Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) 2.1B 
46 Standard General Insuarance Co Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and Excise 2005 (2) SA 168 at para 
22 
47 Hubert H Monroe Intolerable Inquisition? Reflections on the Law of Tax (1981) 35 
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clear understanding of the provision under scrutiny and remove the vagueness. 
Interpretation of fiscal legislation also enables the courts to prevent clauses, 
sentences or words from being superfluous, void or insignificant.48 The contra fiscum 
rule is advantageous to the taxpayer because it propounds that if the courts are in 
doubt or faced with any ambiguity, taxpayer will be given benefit of the doubt.49  
2.3. The intention of the Legislature 
 The objective of the ‘intention of the legislature’ rule is to ascertain the legislature’s 
policy in enacting the provision and interpreting it in a manner so as not to defeat the 
policy.50 This may mean, in appropriate circumstances, giving an expansive 
meaning, and in other cases, a restrictive meaning to a word or phrase, depending on 
the policy of the legislature in enacting such legislation.51 In CIR v Kuttel52 for 
example, a restrictive meaning was given to the words ‘ordinarily resident’ by the 
Appellate Division on the basis that the policy of the legislature was to extent the 
interest exemption concessions to those persons not ordinarily resident in the 
Republic so as to encourage them to invest in the country. The court held that there 
was no reason to extend the meaning of ‘ordinarily resident’ so as to defeat the 
policy which would have been the case should an expansive meaning has been 
applied.53 
The Kuttel case illustra es that one of the main objective of the judiciary 
when interpreting fiscal legislation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. The 
problem is how should the determination of the ‘intention of the legislature’ be done? 
Where do we draw the line?54 
Lessons can be drawn in CIRv Delfos55 case, where Wessels CJ said that, ‘... 
in no case in a taxing Act are we to give a section a narrower or wider meaning than 
its apparent meaning, for in all cases of interpretation we must take the whole statute 
                                                
48 See J Silke ‘ The Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation- Canons of Construction, Recent Judicial 
Comments and New Approaches’ (1995) 58 Acta Juridica 123-168 at 153 
49 Ibid T S Emslie et al at 17 
50 See Glen Anil Development Corperation v SIR 37 SATC 19 
51 GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 112 
52 54 SATC 298 
53 Ibid GK Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 112 
54 See G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change II: Absurd Results’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 44-45 at 45 
55 1933 AD 242 at 254 
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into consideration and so arrive at the true intention of the legislature.’ In support of 
this case, Botha JA in Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR56 said that, ‘... it 
is clear from the remarks of Wessels CJ in the Delfos case... that even in the 
interpretation of fiscal legislation the true intention of the legislature is of paramount 
importance, and, I should say decisive.’57 However, Froneman J in Matiso and 
Others v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizaberth Prison and Others58 viewed that, 
the concept of the ‘intention of the legislature’ does not apply in a system of judicial 
review based on the supremacy of the Constitution because the Constitution and not 
Parliament, is sovereign.59 
2.4. Ambiguity and Obscurity 
2.4.1. General 
Meyerowitz reiterated that problems of interpretation only arise where the provision 
in question is ambiguous or obscure.60 He goes on to say that, if the meaning of 
words of a section is perfectly clear, the problem of interpretation does not arise.61 
The literal approach is the primary rule of interpretation however, if the rule fails to 
clear up the ambiguity or vagueness, then this rule is departed from allowing 
interpreters to resort to evidence outside the text itself.62 This is also known as the 
‘golden rule’ of interpretation. The court will turn to the so-called ‘secondary aids’63 
to interpretation to find the intention of the legislature. If the ‘secondary aids to 
interpretation could not ascertain the intention of the legislature, courts will apply the 
‘tertiary aids’64 of interpretation to legislation.65 
Ambiguity has been regarded by the courts as the threshold for inviting 
contextual factors such as the preamble of an Act, long title, headings, purpose, the 
                                                
56 1975 (4) SA 715 (A) at 334, 37 SATC 19 
57 See also K Jodaarn et el, SILKE: South African 2007 Income Tax (2006) 9 
58 1994 (3) BCLR 80 (SC) at page 87 
59 GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 114 
60 D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) 3.2 para 3.1 
61 Ibid D Meyerowitz (2006-2007) 3.2 para 3.1, see also New Union Goldfield Ltd v CIR 1950 (3) SA 392 
(A) at 404, Enerst v CIR 1954 (1) SA 318 (A) at 324 
62 Robert  Benson The Interpretation Game: How judges and Lawyers Make the Law (2008) 12 
63 For example the long title of an Act, preamble of the Act, the schedules, the headings to chapters and 
sections, dictionary meaning, etc 
64 For example the common law presumptions 
65 C Rautenbach et el Politics, Socio-Economic Issues and Culture in Constitutional Adjudication (2004) 
24 
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presumptions, etc.66 ‘Ambiguity’ is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the 
quality of being open to more than one interpretation, inexactness.’67 The word 
derived from the Latin word ambiguous which means ‘going here and there, 
uncertain, doubtful.’68 However, it must be borne in mind that what seems an 
absurdity to one man does not seem absurd to another and that it is dangerous to 
speculate as to the intention of the legislature.69  
 2.4.2. The Contra fiscum rule 
The contra fiscum rule70 of interpretation states that, where any statutory provision 
which makes inroads on the rights of the individual is ambiguous, the ambiguity 
must be resolved in favour of the individual whose rights are thereby diminished.71 
In other words, when a provision of the Act is reasonably capable of two 
constructions, the court will place the construction upon it that imposes the smaller 
burden on the taxpayer.72  
Meyerowitz, in his article, ‘Has the Contra Fiscum Rule Vanished’, noted 
that there is ample South African authority (of which it is not necessary to cite all) 
evidencing the existence of this rule.73 In the Hulett74  case in1912, Innes ACJ, as 
then he was, said that, ‘... in a taxing statute the proper course is, in cases of doubtful 
construction, is to give the benefit of the doubt to the person sought to be charged.’ 
In Estate Reynolds v CIR75 it was said, ‘... in a matter of doubt we are bound to 
invoke the rule of interpretation contra fiscum.’ In Shell’s Annadale Farm Pty Ltd v 
CIR76, the court extended the contra fiscum rule to cases not only where there is an 
ambiguity in the wording of an Act in question but also where there is an ambiguity 
                                                
66 J De Ville ‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373-389 at 374 
67 Catherine Soanes and Sara Hawker Compact Oxford English Dictionary for Students (2006) 
68 In principle, therefore, ambiguity does not differ from polysemy (that is the existence of several 
meanings in a single word), see J De Ville ‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373-
389 at 386 
69 See De Villiers JA in Shenker v The Master & Another 1936 AD 136 at 143 
70 This principle literally mean ‘against the fiscus’, see RC Williams Income Tax in South Africa: Law and 
Practice 4ed (2006) 9 para 9.3 
71 Ibid TS Emslie et al at 17 
72 K Jodaarn et al SILKE: South African 2007 Income Tax (2006) 9, see also RC Williams ibid at 9 
73 David Meyerowitz ‘Has the Contra Fiscum Rule Vanished?’ (1995) 58 334 Acta Juridica 79-88 at 79 
74 Hulett & Sons Ltd v Resident Magistrate, Lower Tugela 1912 AD 677 
75 1937 AD 57 at 70, see also Centlivres CJ in Israelsohn v CIR 1952 (3) SA 529 (A) at 540, and also Lord 
Tinkerton in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Ross & Coulter and Others 1948 1 All ER 616 at 625, and 
also D Meyerowitz ‘Has the Contra Fiscum Rule Vanished?’ (1995) 58 334 Acta Juridica 79-88 at 79 
76 1999 (C), 62 SATC 97 
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about the intention of the legislature, even if there was no obvious ambiguity in the 
wording.  
Meyerowitz also viewed that there is the continued existence and application 
of the contra fiscum rule which appears to have lost some if not all its significance.77 
Dennis Davis noted in The Taxpayer, an extract from the late Rex Welsh, an 
outstanding tax advocate, who wrote that the old-fashioned maxim contra fiscum 
must be amended to read pro fisco omnia praesumuntur, meaning that everything 
should be presumed in favour of the fiscus.78 However, it must be noted that when 
interpreting anti-avoidance legislation, the contra fiscum rule has limited 
application.79 As was recognised in the Glen Anil Corporation80 case where the court 
averred that, an anti-avoidance provision should ‘... be construed... in such a way that 
it will advance the remedy provided by the section and suppress the mischief against 
which the section is directed.’  
In a nutshell, the contra fiscum rule has been and still remains part of the 
South African common law and is not in conflict with the Constitution. In fact, it 
contemplates the principles underpinning the Constitution by ensuring an element of 
equity in the interpretation of fiscal legislation.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
77 David Meyerowitz et al ‘The Contra Fiscum Rule’ (2006) 55 2 The Taxpayer 36-37 at 36 
78 Ibid 
79 See David Clegg ‘Purposive Approach: Interpretation of Tax Law’ (2008) 22 Tax Planning 26-27 at 27 
80 1975 (4) SA 715 (A), 37 SATC 319 at 334 
81 GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 116 
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CHAPTER 3: CANONS OF INTERPRETATION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
3.1. Introduction 
The canons of construction are interpretive directives or way-marks, deriving from 
English common law and forming part of present-day case law and statute law.82 
They carry varying degrees of weight depending on their closeness to preferred or 
privileged approaches to interpretation of fiscal statutes in the South African legal 
system, and they are relied on to justify, explain and lend legitimacy to the outcomes 
of reasoned constructions of statutes and of the Constitution.83  
They form part of the South African common law and they have no status as 
legal rules; they are just conceptual models applied by judges and others interpreters 
(for example, revenue authorities or customs officers) grappling with the meaning of 
particular legislative provisions.84 Failure to ‘follow’ or ‘apply’ a rule of statutory 
interpretation is not an appealable or reviewable error. Although bad interpretations 
may be appealed or revealed, the error lies in failing to interpret the statute correctly, 
not in failing to apply a particular statutory interpretation rule. 85  
The rules of interpretation are important for several reasons. They inform 
interpreters what values and factors to take into account when dealing with a 
legislative text. They supply the vocabulary in which texts are analysed and 
explained, and they shape the arguments used by interpreters in defending their 
preferred interpretation and by judges in justifying their decisions;86 thus bringing 
certainty into the judiciary about the subject of interpretation of statutes. However, it 
has been said that for every canon pointing that way, there is bound to be another one 
pointing another way. This has been referred to as them ‘hunting in pairs’.87 
                                                
82 Loorence Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Stautes (2005) 128 
83 Ibid Du Plessis 
84 T Emslie et al Tax Cases and Materials 3ed (2001) 15 
85 Ruth Sullivan Statutory Interpretation 2ed (2007) 30 
86 Ibid Sullivan at 2 
87 87 TS Emslie, DM Davis and SJ Hutton Income Tax Cases and Material 3ed (2001) 15-16, see also 
Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law 315, and also Llewellyn (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395, 
quoted in MacCormack Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 207 
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In Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR,88 it was held that the 
interpretive aids used by the courts in interpreting other statutes also apply to the 
interpretation of tax Acts. Trevor Emslie in The Taxpayer highlighted that the law of 
taxation, possibly more so than other branches of the law, requires constant 
interpretation and re-interpretation of the legislation in terms of which it is levied, 
principally due to the fact that the legislation is- in the case of most taxes- amended 
each and every year, giving rise annually to a fresh statute as amended.89  
It is important to note Dennis Davis in The Taxpayer who viewed that, 
although the Darwin’s theory in respect of the evolution of mankind is accepted by 
many it still remains controversial. He noted that the same can be said in regard to 
the evolution of interpretation of statutes, from literal reading of the language used to 
the purposive approach which is gaining ground, particularly as applicable to taxing 
statutes.90 
Be that may be, the rules of interpretation can never bring certainty in the 
interpretation of fiscal statutes. Emslie reiterates that the ideal of certainty in tax law 
remains as elusive as ever, and the challenge facing students, teachers and 
practitioners alike is to ‘manage’ uncertainty as to the tax consequences of economic 
acts [and the interpretation thereof] in as prudent and professional a manner as 
possible.91 
3.2. The Traditional/Orthodox Approach: The Literal/Textual Approach 
 3.2.1. General 
The principal canon of interpretation in respect of taxation of statutes, indeed of all 
statutes, often called the cardinal rule, is the literal/textual approach.92 According to 
the literal/textual approach, the true meaning of a statutory provision is to be sought 
                                                
88 Supra 
89 David Meyerowitz, Trevor S Emslie and Dennis M Davis ‘The So-called Method of Purposive 
Construction of Legislation’ (2008) 57 12 The Taxpayer 224-228 at 224 
90 David Meyerowitz Trevor S Emslie and Dennis M Davis ‘The Evolution in the Interpretation of Tax 
Statutes’ (2008) 57 9 The Taxpayer 161-163 at 161 
91 T Emslie and D Davis et al Supplement to Income Tax Cases and Materials (2008) preface 
92 HR Hahlo and Ellison Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 180, see 
also D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) 3.4 para 3.6 
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virtually exclusively in the very words used by the legislature.93 There is no doubt 
that the literal or textual approach takes precedence above all other approaches when 
interpreting fiscal legislation. The ordinary grammatical and literal meaning of words 
is also referred to as to the primary rule of interpretation.94 The ordinary meaning of 
a word or a group of works is not their dictionary meaning, but the meaning that 
would be understood by a competent language user upon reading the words in their 
immediate context.95  
The rationale of the literal/textual approach is twofold. First is that, ‘words 
themselves are the surest, safest evidence of the author’s actual subjective intentions 
(intention of the legislature).’96 The second rationale is objective, it state that ‘the law 
has to be objectively knowable so that people can rely upon it in planning their 
affairs’ and it is plain to all reasonable people.97 Nicholas JA, delivering the 
judgement of the Appellate Division, as it then was, in R Koster & Son Pty Ltd & 
another v CIR98 said that the rule is well established ‘that in construing a provision of 
an Act of Parliament the plain meaning of its language must be adopted ...’99  
The premises of the literal meaning approach in South Africa is the maxim, 
judicis st ius dicere sed non dare. This maxim entails that, the judicial function is 
passive, to ‘interpret, discover or state’ the law rather than to ‘make it’.100 
Interpretation is in general to ascertain the intention of the legislature (law maker) 
from a study of the provisions in question and if the intention of the legislature is not 
expressed, there is a casus omissus which cannot be supplied by the courts whose 
sole duty is to interpret the Act as it stands.101 
                                                
93 Linda van Schalkwyk and Bernard Geldenhuys ‘Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax Act and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes in South Africa’ (2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 
at 170 see also George E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) 26, and also EJP Smit and AV 
Naude Law, Government and People (2007) 36 
94 Ibid GK Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 111 
95 R Sullivan Statutory Interpretation 2ed (2007) 50 
96 R Benson The Interpretation Game: How judges and Lawyers Make the Law (2008) 8 
97 Ibid 
98 47 SATC 24 at 32 
99 See also K Jodaarn et al SILKE: South African 2007 Income Tax (2006) 9 
100 Ibid TS Emslie et al at 16 
101 Louis Zinn Organization Pty Ltd 1958 (4) SA 477 (A) at 485H, see also New Union Goldfield case at 
407 and also Summit Industrial Corporation v Jade Transporters 1987 (2) SA 583 (A) at 596J-597B 
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The literal approach dates back from the aforementioned case of Partington v 
Attorney General102 where in his dictum, Lord Cairns state that, ‘if the person sought 
to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the 
hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be...’103 This dictum had been approved 
by the South African courts, for example, de Villiers JA did approve and followed 
this dictum in CIR v George Forest Timber Co104 and ever since, it has been referred 
to South African cases repeatedly.105  
Also the Appellate Division in the Simpson106 case, followed the dicta in 
Cape Brandy Syndicate case where Rowlatt J state that, ‘... in a taxing Act one has to 
look at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity 
about tax... one can only look fairly at the language used.’107 Silke on South African 
Income Tax viewed that the above statement means that, ‘the court must administer 
the Act (Income Tax) according to its plain language, and if the language is plain, it 
must be given effect to even if the result to the taxpayer is harsh and unfair.’108 
Meyerowitz viewed that a grammatical and logical construction must be 
placed on the words in a statute.109 The words must be read in light of their popular 
or ordinary and natural sense, carelessness in drafting notwithstanding, and the 
context must not be ignored.110 At the same time ‘considerations which may serve to 
interpret expressions which are obscure or ambiguous cannot be invoked so as to 
stigmatise words which are plain’.111 However, it must be borne in mind that ‘what 
seems an absurdity to one man does not seem absurd to another.’112 The absurdity 
must be glaring, not just a mere likelihood.113 
                                                
102 Supra 
103 Partington v Attorney General 1869 21 LT 370 at 375, LR 4 HR 100 at 122 
104 1924 AD 516, 1 SATC 20 
105 CIR v Wolf 1928 AD 177 at 185, New Era Consolidated Ltd v CIR 1951 (3) SA 211 (T) at 215, CIR v 
Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A) at 592, Loewenstein v COT 1956 (4) SA 766 (FC) at 772 
106 supra  
107 Cape Brandy Syndicate case at 71 
108 Ibid K Jordaan at al at para 25.1, see also  T Steyn ‘Tax Laws: Old Rules, New Tools’ (2009) 9 5 
Without Prejudice 6-7 at 6 
109 D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) 3.5 para 3.10 
110 New Union Goldfield Ltd v Ltd 1950 (3) SA 392 (A) at 404, CIR v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co 
Ltd 1960 (3) SA 1 (A) at 9 
111 New Goldfield case at 405 
112 Savage’s case at 408-9 
113 Ibid Meyerowitz at 109 
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There is no equity about a tax.114 The extent of the taxpayer’s liability must of 
necessity be determined with reference to the language of the statute unaided by 
equitable considerations.115 The South African judiciary has indicated that, when 
applying the literal rule of interpretation, the ordinary, grammatical wording is 
decisive about the legislature’s intention; there is no necessity to look further.116 
There is no mystique about tax law and the intention of the legislature is determined 
by looking fairly at the language used.117 In the Partington118 case above, it was 
submitted that the strict and literal rule of interpretation was incorrectly perceived by 
the judiciary as a mechanism to protect a taxpayer from poorly drafted, unclear, 
uncertain and arbitrary provisions.  
 However, the literal rule’s application may often be difficult, for what is the 
‘literal meaning’?119 Still on this point, Shreiner JA in Savage v CIR120 remarked 
that,  
... what seems clear to one man may not seem clear to another. This 
consideration must also, I think, be borne in mind where one refers to the 
literal, ordinary, natural or primary meaning of words or expressions. The 
“literal” meaning is not something revealed to judges by sort of authentic 
dictionary; it is only what individual judges think is the literal meaning,...121    
 
With this, it is important to highlight the short comings of the literal 
approach. 
3.2.2. Short comings of the literal/textual approach 
The literal approach’s road to fame had been clouded by various shortcomings 
resulting in the adoption of other rules of interpretation, chiefly the purposive 
approach. First and foremost, the primary rule can be departed from if the ordinary 
grammatical language gives rise to absurdity. In such a case, the court is justified 
                                                
114 See the dictum of Rowlatt J in Cape Brandy Syndicate case supra at 71 
115 Ibid TS Emslie et al at 16 
116 G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change II: Absurd Results’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 44-45 at 44 
117 These are the words of Coetzee J in SIR v Kirsch 1978 (3) SA 93 (T) 
118 Supra 
119 D Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2006-2007) 3.5 para 3.9 
120 1951 (4) SA 400 (A) at 410 
121 See also T Steyn ‘Tax Laws: Old Rules, New Tools’ (2009) 9 5 Without Prejudice 6-7 at 6 
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from departing from the ordinary effect of the words to the extent necessary to 
remove the absurdity and to give effect to the true intention of the legislature.122 
‘A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances 
and the time in which it is used’, these are the words of Holmes in one of his 
opinions for the United States Supreme Court in the case of Towne v Eisner.123 Word 
‘meanings are cultural artefacts produced in the course of history’124 and ‘there can 
never be a dictionary of all words in all contexts because contexts are infinite as 
culture itself and culture is constantly inventing new things for words by using them 
in new contexts.’125  
In addition, Goldswain noted that, owing to the very nature of, and more 
specifically, the translation of legislation from Afrikaans to English or the vice versa, 
the meaning of words in legislation are often not entirely clear and the legislature’s 
intention is not manifest.126 For example, in Geldenhuys v CIR 14 SATC 419, the 
court had to decide on the meaning of the words ‘received by’ as used in the 
definition of the ‘gross income’ of section 1 of the Income Tax Act.127 Fortunately, 
the meaning attributed by the court to the words ‘received by’ bore little relationship 
to its ordinary grammatical meaning. If the court had not restricted its meaning to 
‘received by the taxpayer on his own behalf and for his own benefit’, it would have 
led to absurd results, for example, loans should have been taxable and amount 
received by agents on a principal’s behalf would have been taxable in the hands of 
the agent.128 
Professor Emslie, in his book Tax Cases and Materials viewed that ‘the 
literal meaning to the interpretation of statutes is a convenient fiction’ and that ‘it is 
                                                
122 GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 111, see also Venter v R 1907 TS 910, M 
v COT 21 SATC 16 
123 Towne v Eisner (1918) 245 U.S 418 at 425 
124 R Benson The Interpretation Game: How judges and Lawyers Make the Law (2008) 74 
125 Ibid R Benson at 34 
126 GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 112 
127 58 of 1962 
128 Geldenhuys v CIR 14 SATC 419 at 430, see also GK Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy 
Research 107-121 at 112 
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naive to believe that statutes can be interpreted literally.’129 He goes on to say that, 
linguistic philosophers such as Wittgenstein have pointed out that words, sentences 
and texts can never have meaning in themselves: they are used in the context that 
they have meaning.130 Moreover, judges who purport to lay down the ‘literal 
meaning’ of a legislative provision in reality resort to a device which justifies their 
construction rather than informs it.131 
Plain language meaning lost the way in the case of Commissioner, SARS v 
Airworld CC & Another132 where Combrinck JA found out that the word 
‘beneficiary’ was capable of attributing various different meanings if construed in its 
ordinary meaning.133 Doubt has been cast on whether the strict and literal 
interpretation rule was ever part of the South African common law even long before 
the adoption of the Constitution.134 Devenish support this point by giving reference 
to a teleological methodology of interpretation used by the popular Roman-Dutch 
scholars such as De Groot and Voet, who advocated a purposive methodology 
against the background of natural law.135 
Goldswain noted that, since the advent of the Constitution, arguments against 
the continued application of the strict and literal rule have gained momentum. Many 
commentators, including the judiciary, have suggested that a purposive approach 
should be followed.136 In Du Plesis & Others v De Klerk & Another137, it was viewed 
that constitutional interpretation is concerned with the recognition and application of 
Constitutional issues and not with the literal meaning of legislation.  
                                                
129 TS Emslie et al Income Tax Cases and Material 3ed 16 
130 Ibid Income Tax Cases and Material 3ed 16, see also The Interpretation Game: How judges and 
Lawyers Make the Law (2008) 35 
131 Ibid TS Emslie et al at 16, see also Dennis V Cowen ‘The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of 
“The Intention of the Legislature”’ (1980) 43 THRHR 374 
132 2008 (3) SA 335 (SCA) at 340 
133 See D Clegg ‘Purposive Approach: Interpretation of Tax Law’ (2008) 22 Tax Planning 26-27 at 26, 
and also TS Emslie  and DM Davis Supplementary to Income Tax Cases and Materials (2008) 4 
134 G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change III: The Constitution- A catalyst for Change’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 
69-71 at 69 
135 George E Devenish ‘Teleological Evaluations: A Theory and Modus Operandi of Statutory 
Interpretation in South Africa’ (1991) 6 1 SA Public Law at 375, see also ‘Winds of Change III: The 
Constitution- A catalyst for Change’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 69-71 at 69-70 
136 G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change III: The Constitution- A catalyst for Change’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 
69-71 at 70 
137 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at 722 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
20 
3.3. The Modern Approach: Purposive/Contextual Approach 
The purposive and contextual approaches are regarded as the new or modern 
approaches to the interpretation of fiscal statutes and other legislations in general. 
These approaches were adopted by the courts in its willingness to go beyond the 
literal grammatical meaning of words in order to ascertain the intention of the 
legislature. The purposive approach and the contextual approach are intertwined in 
that, the ‘purposive approach’ attributes meaning to a legislative provision in the 
light of the purpose it seeks to achieve and the ‘contextual approach’ is used to 
establish that purpose.138 
The purposive approach has become a staple of modern interpretation. It is 
used not only when the language of a text is found to be ambiguous but in every case 
and at every stage of interpretation. This reliance is justified why the interaction 
between language and purpose that is present in all communication, including 
legislation.139 The interpreter, listener or reader infers the purpose from what is being 
said and the circumstances in which it is being said, and at the same time understands 
what is being said in light of the purpose.140 
The purposive approach’s primary objective to the interpretation of fiscal 
statutes is to determine the purpose of the legislation.141 Consequently, the 
application and utilisation of the presumptions and the various aids to interpretation 
are very important tools for the interpreters in the quest for the scope and purpose of 
the legislation concerned.142 
Trevor Emslie in The Taxpayer is of much authority when he state that,  
...when one bears in mind that the object of all statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain the legal fiction that we label “the intention of the legislature”, there 
can clearly be no quarrel with the notion that the “purpose” of the legislation-
as a whole, and with reference to the particular words being interpreted- 
should be used as a guide in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature.143  
                                                
138 L Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 96-7 and 111, see also WA Joubert and JA Faris The 
Law of South Africa (2001) 285 and 297 
139 R Sullivan Statutory Interpretation 2ed (2007) 194 
140 Ibid Sullivan 
141 Devenish at 35 
142 Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 3ed (1998) 31-32 
143 D Meyerowitz et al ‘The So-called Method of Purposive Construction of Legislation’ (2008) 57 12 The 
Taxpayer 224-228 at 225 
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‘Legislative purpose’ refers to a number of different things, but chiefly, it 
refers to the primary aim or object of an enactment, that is, the effect the legislature 
hopes to produce through the operation of its rules or scheme.144 It also refers to the 
function performed by a provision or a series of provisions in a legislative scheme, or 
the contribution a provision make to an existing body of law. It is assumed that every 
word of the legislation, every feature of a legislative text, is there and takes the form 
it does because it contributes in some particular way to the scheme of the Act or the 
body of existing law. This contribution is its purpose, its raison d'être.145 
Davenish, in supporting the purposive over the literal approach, explains that 
‘interpretation should not depend exclusively on the literal meaning of words 
according to semantic and grammatical analysis. A purposive methodology looks 
beyond the manifested intention. The purposive theory has its ratio in the fact that a 
statute is a legislative communication between the legislature and the public that is 
inherently purposive. The interpreter must endeavour to infer the design and purpose 
which lies behind the legislation. In order to do this the interpreter should make use 
of an unqualified contextual approach which allows an unconditional examination of 
all internal and external sources’.146 
Furthermore, Shreiner JA in his minority decision in Jaga v Donges said that, 
‘Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words and 
expressions used in the statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary 
meaning is the statement that they must be interpreted in the light of their context’.147 
In addition, the judge explained that the language of the statute, the subject-matter of 
the statute, its apparent scope and purpose and its background, all constituted the 
context against which legislation ought to be interpreted.148 
The courts may modify or adapt the initial meaning of the text to harmonise it 
with the purpose of the legislation. The role of the courts is flexible and it is not 
                                                
144 This objective could be a social or economic goal, such as tax exemption, tax benefit, preventing 
double taxation, job creation or a deduction allowance.  
145 R Sullivan Statutory Interpretation 2ed (2007) 195-6 
146 GE Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 1st ed (1992) para 35.6, see also D Meyerowitz, TS Emslie and 
DM Davis ‘The Evolution in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes’ (2008) 57 9 The Taxpayer 161-163 at 162 
147 Jaga v Donges 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 662G, see also C Botha Statutory Interpretation: An 
Introduction for Students 4ed (2005) 51 
148 Supra Jaga v Donges at 662G-H, see also Fanyana ka Mdumbe (2004) 19 2 SA Publiekreg 472-481 at 
474 
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limited to mere textual analysis and mechanical application of the legislation.149 As 
opposite to the judicis est ius dicere sed non dare maxim, Botha argues that during 
statutory interpretation, the judiciary has an ‘inherent lawmaking discretion’.150 
However, this discretion can be qualified by the prerequisite that modification of the 
meaning of the text is possible only if and when the scope and purpose of the 
legislation is absolutely clear, and also supports such modification.151 
The purposive approach’s affluence had been informed by the canons of 
taxation which includes necessity, equality or equity, certainty etc. In addition, other 
common law principles and presumptions had made this approach viable and made it 
a dream come true in South African judiciary upon which fiscal statutes should be 
construed. A good example is the contra fiscum rule discussed above and the 
presumption against double taxation to be discussed below. 
Goldswain considers that the judiciary has accepted the purposive approach 
to the interpretation of legislation as the correct one to follow in principle.152 The 
following are recent case law decisions highlighting the acceptance of the purposive 
approach by the South African judicial. 
3.3.1. De Beers Marine Pty Ltd v CSARS153 
In De Beers Marine case Nienaber JA emphasised the cardinal importance of the 
context in the words or phrases are used when interpreting tax statutes.154 At 
paragraph 7, Nienaber JA when dealing with the meaning of the word ‘export’ for 
the purpose of section 20(4) of the Income Tax Act- which draws a distinction 
between export and home consumption- stated that the word must ‘take its colour, 
like a chameleon, from its setting and surrounds in the Act’. Nienaber JA thus 
prescribed a modern (purposive) approach to the interpretation of tax statutes.155 
                                                
149 Botha at 31-32, see also J De Ville ‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373-389 
at 377 
150 Ibid Botha 3ed (1998) 31-32 
151 Ibid Botha 
152 GK Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 117, see also Goldswain 
‘Winds of Change IV: Some Guidelines’ (2009) 23 Tax Planning 77-78 at 77 
153 2002 (3) All SA 181 (A) 
154 Linda van Schalkwyk and Bernard Geldenhuys ‘Tainted Element-II : Misuse and abuse-A Modern 
Approach’ (2010) 24 31 Tax Planning: corporate and Personal 31-32 at 31 
155 See D Meyerowitz et al ‘The So-called Method of Purposive Construction of Legislation’ (2008) 57 12 
The Taxpayer 224-228 at 224, see also L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys (2009) 17 2 Meditary 
Accountancy Research 167-185 at 171,  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
23 
3.3.2. Standard General Insurance Company v CCE156 
In this case, Nuget and Lewis JJA reference the dictum of Shreiner JA in the case of 
Jaga v Donges N.O157 and Nienaber JA in De Beers case158 as authority of the 
application of the modern approach to the interpretation of tax statutes. At paragraph 
25, instead of attempting to draw inferences about the drafter’s intention, from an 
uncertain premise, the judges found great assistance in drawing their conclusion by 
considering the extent to which the meaning given to the words achieves or defeats 
the apparent scope and purpose of the legislation.159 
3.3.3. CSARS v Airworld CC and Another160 
In this case, Hurt AJA favoured a purposive construction to tax statutes. As authority 
for this view, he cited the dictum of Nuget J and Lewis JA in Standard General 
Insurance Company Ltd v CCE161. Hurt AJA required that the purpose of a provision 
be established and used ‘in conjunction with the appropriate meaning of the language 
of the provision, as a guide in order to ascertain the legislator’s intention’.162 He thus 
prescribed a modern (purposive) approach to the interpretation of tax statutes. 
The court a quo found that the word ‘beneficiary’ could have more than one 
meaning and in this case, Hurt AJA applied the method of purposive construction. 
The leaned judge reiterated that, ‘in recent years courts have placed emphasis on the 
purpose with which the Legislature has enacted the relevant provision. The 
interpreter must endeavour to arrive at an interpretation which gives effect to such 
purpose. The purpose (which is usually clear or easily discernible) is used, in 
conjunction with the appropriate meaning of the language of the provision, as a guide 
in order to ascertain the legislator’s intention.’163 
                                                
156 2004 (2) All SA 376 (SCA) 
157 1950 (4) SA 653 at 662 
158 Supra at para 7 
159 See also L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys ‘Tainted Element-II : Misuse and abuse-A Modern 
Approach’ (2010) 24 31 Tax Planning: corporate and Personal 31-32 at 31 
160 2008 (2) All SA 593 
161 Supra at para 35 
162 At para 25, see also T Steyn ‘Tax Laws: Old Rules, New Tools’ (2009) 9 5 Without Prejudice 6-7 at 6, 
and also L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys (2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 at 
171, and See D Clegg ‘Purposive Approach: Interpretation of Tax Law’ (2008) 22 Tax Planning 26-27 at 
27 
163 At 235, see also D Meyerowitz et al ‘The So-called Method of Purposive Construction of Legislation’ 
(2008) 57 12 The Taxpayer 224-228 at 224 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
24 
3.3.4. Metropolitan Life Ltd v CSARS164 
In Metropolitan Life Ltd case, Davis J approved the dictum of Hurt AJA in Airworld 
case165. At page 170, he indicated that the Act and its amendments should be 
‘interpreted purposively and holistically and that provisions should be given a clear 
meaning whenever plausible’. He then approved the modern (purposive) approach to 
the interpretation of tax statutes.166 
The above recent tax decisions confirms that the modern purposive approach 
to the interpretation of the tax statutes is already authoritative in South Africa. The 
wording of section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, with the heading 
‘Interpretation’, reads as follows, ‘[i]n this Act, unless the ‘context’ otherwise 
indicates-...’ (Emphasis provided).  
This approach is keeping with what the legislature can be expected to intend 
against the background of the values of the constitutional democracy based on the 
Bill of Rights, than the heavy hand of unyielding authority implicit in the traditional, 
strict approach to the interpretation of taxing statutes167 by ascertaining the intention 
of Parliament by reading an Act as a whole and placing in context the ends sought to 
be achieved (the objective) and the relationship between the individual provisions of 
the Act (the scheme).168 However, in the South African judiciary, there have not been 
step by step guidelines on how to apply the purposive approach to interpretation in 
practice.  
3.4. The Mischief rule 
This rule was developed in the famous Heydon case169 and it is regarded as the 
forerunner of the purposive/contextual approach to interpretation.170 The ‘mischief 
                                                
164 (2008) 70 SATC 162 
165 Supra at para 25 
166 See L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys (2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 at 171, 
see also L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys ‘Tainted Element-II : Misuse and abuse-A Modern 
Approach’ (2010) 24 31 Tax Planning: corporate and Personal 31-32 at 31 
167 T Steyn ‘Tax Laws: Old Rules, New Tools’ (2009) 9 5 Without Prejudice 6-7 at 6, see also Dennis 
Davis ‘Democracy: Its influence upon the Process of Constitutional Interpretation (1994) 10 SAJHR 103 
at 104, and also Lourence Du Plessis and Jacques De Ville ‘Bill of Rights Interpretation in the South 
African Context’ (1993) 4 Stell LR 63 at 199and 356 
168 See G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change II: Absurd Results’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 44-45 at 44 
169 [1584] 76 ER 637 
170 C Rautenbach et el Politics, Socio-Economic Issues and Culture in Constitutional Adjudication 
(2004) 24 
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rule’ applies to any statutory provision designed to suppress a particular form of 
mischief which the legislature perceives as harmful to the public interest.171 
According to this rule, in order to arrive at the purpose or meaning of the legislature, 
four questions had to be asked, namely: 
• What was the law before the measure under consideration was passed? 
• What was the mischief or defect for which the law as it stood before the 
measure in question had not being passed had not provided? 
• What remedy had the legislature created? 
• What is the reason for that remedy? 
Monroe172 viewed that, ‘it is an accepted and salutary principle when 
interpreting a written law to start by identifying the mischief which the law was 
designed to remedy.’ Monroe goes on to say that it make sense, therefore, to 
‘approach the law of tax by looking first at the circumstances in which income tax 
entered the law. What were the considerations which governed its shape and its 
structure?’173 In supporting the mischief rule, the Appellate Division, as it then was, 
in Glen Anil Development Corporation v CIR174, viewed that section 103 of the 
Income Tax Act should be construed ‘... in such a way that it will advance the 
remedy provided by the section and suppress the mischief against which the section 
is directed.’175 
3.5. The Common Law Presumptions of Statutory interpretation (tertiary 
aids) 
There is no presumption as to a tax.176 However, presumptions are legal rules derived 
from the common law and they are intrinsic to the principle of legality because they 
qualify Parliament’s legislative enactments and exist side by side with the provisions 
of all statutes.177 They are described as assumptions that the courts take into account 
                                                
171 HR Hahlo and E Khan The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 182-186, see also T 
Emslie Income Tax Cases and Material 3ed 17 
172 Ibid HH Monroe at 2 
173 Ibid 
174 1975 (4) SA 715 (A) at 334  
175 See also T Steyn ‘Tax Laws: Old Rules, New Tools’ (2009) 9 5 Without Prejudice 6-7 at 6 
176 Supra Partington case 
177 Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 314-5, see also TS Emslie et al Income Tax Cases and Material 
3ed (2001) 15 
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in interpreting statutory provisions.178 According to Botha, all the intra-textual and 
extra-textual aids as well as the presumption assist in determining the purpose of the 
legislation.179 
Cowen viewed that,  
[P]resumptions are legal principles, comprising a basic or fundamental part of 
the legal system. Statutes are not isolated phenomena but should be integrated 
or harmonised with the whole legal system of which they form a part. It 
follows, therefore, that such presumptions should be taken in to account by 
the interpreter, right from the outset, no matter how seemingly clear, the 
words of the enactment may seem considered in isolation. Furthermore, when 
all the relevant contextual considerations have been duly weighed, the 
interpreter should again test his conclusions in the light of the 
presumptions.180 
 In ITC 1384181 the Free State High Court believed that the legislature is 
presumed not to have intended an unfair, unjust or unreasonable result and that a 
taxing statute must be so interpreted as to be as unoppressive as possible.182 In this 
case, the judge considers public interest and stress that public affairs, on fiscal level, 
must be administered fairly, reasonable and justly. Moreover, it was put forth that, 
taxing acts have by their very nature great social import and may therefore cause 
great damage to vital social requirements if unwisely framed and improperly 
administered.183 
In trying to construe the meaning of the word ‘beneficiary’ in the Airworld184 
case reliance was placed on various cases185 for the proposition that there is a 
presumption or reasonable supposition  that the same words or expressions in the 
same Act are intended to bear the same meaning where no indication to the contrary 
is given.186 
                                                
178 Lovemore Madhuku An Introduction to Zimbabwean Law (2010) 160 
179 Ibid Botha at 18 and 77, see also J De Ville ‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 
373-389 at 378 
180 DV Cowen ‘The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of the Intention of the Legislature’ (1980) 
43 THRHR 374 at 392 
181 46 SATC 95 at 101 and 106 
182See T Steyn (2009) 9 5 Without Prejudice 6-7 at 7, see also J Silke The Interpretation of Fiscal 
Legislation-Canons of Construction, Recent Judicial Comments and New Approaches’ (1995) 58 Acta 
Juridica 123-168 at 123 
183 Ibid J Silke at 126 
184 Supra 
185 See Minister of Interior v Machadodorp Investments Pty Ltd 1957 (2) SA 395 (A) at 404D, 
Consolidated Textile Mills Ltd v President of the Industrial Court 1989 (1) SA 302 (A) at 308C-D 
186 TS Emslie and DM Davis Supplementary to Income Tax: Cases and Materials (2010) 2 
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The presumption against double taxation expresses the notion that when 
interpreting fiscal statutes, the interpreter have to take heed of the principle of 
equality by not taxing the very little income of the taxpayer twice. This presumption 
is embedded and it informs the purposive approach. 
3.6. Constitutional Interpretation: The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 
Before the advent of the new constitutional dispensation the literal approach 
continued to dominate the judicial approach to the interpretation of fiscal legislation. 
The role of taxation had changed over centuries, from the mere collections of taxes to 
support a sovereign ruler and his or her courtiers in earlier times to collection of 
taxes to achieve social, economic and other objectives in a modern democracy.187 
Constitutional interpretation is therefore not concerned with a search to find the 
literal meaning of legislation, but the recognition and application of Constitutional 
values.188  
Fiscal legislation, in modern times, have always have a purpose and this is 
particularly so in South Africa at present, where there is need to uplift the previously 
oppressed and disadvantaged population.189 It therefore makes sense when 
interpreting legislation, to establish the purpose behind the enactment of any 
legislation. The coming of the Constitution led the strict interpretation of fiscal 
legislation to give way to a more equitable approach in line with the principles of the 
Constitution (purposive and contextual approach).190 
Section 39 of the Constitution contains the interpretation clause and section 
39(1)(b) read out that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum, 
‘must consider international law.’ Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969 favours a purposive approach and it states that, ‘a treaty shall be 
                                                
187 GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds of 
Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 114 
188 G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change III: The Constitution- A catalyst for Change’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 
69-71 at 70 
189 Ibid Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 114  
190 Silke 1995 at 136, see also GK Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 
114, and also D Davis ‘Democracy- Its Influence upon the Process of  Constitutional Interpretation’ 
(1994) 10 SAJHR 103, and Du Plesis and De Ville ‘Bills of Rights Interpretation in the South African 
Context’ (1993) 4 Stell LR 63, 199 and 356 and John Murphy ‘The Constitutional Review of Taxation’ 
(1995) 58 Acta Juridica 89 at 89 
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interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of a treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.'191 
Section 39(2) states that, ‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ This provision does not 
state that the Bill of Rights should be consulted only if the wording used in the 
statute is not clear or if strict literal interpretation would be inconsistent with the 
Constitution. It requires the interpreter to consider the external context of legislation 
(the values and principles contained in the Bill of Rights) right from the outset.192 
The above entails that, interpretation of statutes starts with the Constitution and not 
the legislative text.193 
In effect, in interpreting legislation, the judiciary is obliged to promote, 
amongst other things, the protection of liberty of a person, their property and the 
enforcement of the principles of human dignity, equality, fairness and transparency 
by public officials. Unfairness, inequality and unreasonableness are no longer 
tolerated in either the legislation (including fiscal statutes) or the conduct of public 
officials.194 These qualities are central to the purposive theory to the interpretation of 
statutes. 
However, it must be noted that, virtually every provision of the Income Tax 
Act, prima facie, interferes with a person’s fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. 
195 In fact, the very imposition of tax violates the right not to be deprived of one’s 
property.196 Tax audits, investigations and search and seizure procedures undermine 
the right to privacy197 as well as with possibly with the right to dignity.198 Answering 
written inquiries or attending a judiciary inquiry and being compelled to answer 
questions, could offend against the right to remain silent and not to be compelled to 
                                                
191 Article 31(1) 
192 Ibid Fanyana ka Mdumbe (2004) 19 2 SA Publiekreg 472-481 at 475 
193 C Rautenbach et el Politics, Socio-Economic Issues and Culture in Constitutional Adjudication (2004) 
27 
194 G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change III: The Constitution- A catalyst for Change’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 
69-71 at70 
195 RC Williams Income Tax in South Africa: Law and Practice 4ed (2006) 9 
196 Section 25 of the Constitution 
197 Section 14 of the Constitution 
198 Section 10 of the Constitution 
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give self-incriminating evidence.199 The right to equality200 clashes with sections that 
provide, for example, that taxpayer over the age of 65 are entitled to a larger medical 
deduction or tax rebate than those under the age of 65.201 
Despite such inconsistency and actions, these rights are not absolute. They 
are subject to a limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution which states that 
the rights in the Bill of Rights may be ‘limited in terms of law of general application 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justified in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality, freedom taking into account all relevant 
factors...’ This limitation of rights provision is a major obstacle for taxpayers wishing 
to contest the violation of their constitutional rights.202 Moreover, In Law Society of 
Zimbabwe v Minister of finance203 the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe expressed the 
view that the constitutionality of a tax cannot be questioned simply because it is 
actually or potentially harsh. 
The significance of the Constitutional injunction to the courts can be fully 
understood if it is read together with the supremacy clause204 and the application 
provision which determines that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of the state.205 The effect of 
these provisions, read together, is that the courts cannot ignore section 39(2), which 
is couched in peremptory terms, in favour of the common law approaches, for the 
reason that the Constitution is the lex fundamentalis of South Africa’s new legal 
order and must inform the courts’ approach to statutory interpretation (including 
fiscal statutes).206  
In addition, the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.207 
The courts are formally vested with the power to test the Constitutional validity of a 
government or parliamentary action, including legislation passed by that body. 
Moreover, in terms of section 167(5) of the Constitution, only the Constitutional 
                                                
199 Section 35(3)(j) of the Constitution 
200 Section 9 of the Constitution 
201 See also GK Goldswain ‘The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of fiscal Legislation- the Winds 
of Change’ (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 118 
202 Ibid Goldswain (2008) 16 2 Meditari Accountancy Research 107-121 at 118 
203 61 SATC 458 (SCZ) 
204 Section 2 of the Constitution 
205 Section 8(1) of the Constitution 
206 Ibid Fanyana ka Mdumbe at 475 
207 Section 165(1) of the Constitution 
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Court may make a final decision on whether an Act of Parliament is constitutional. It 
must confirm an order of invalidity made by another court before that order has 
validity.208 
Constitutional interpretation is similar to, but not identical to ‘ordinary’ 
statutory interpretation. The difference was explained by Fronman J in the Matiso209 
case. The judge viewed that, interpretation of the Constitution is directed at 
ascertaining the foundational values inherent in the Constitution, whilst the 
interpretation of other legislation is directed at ascertaining whether that legislation is 
capable of an interpretation which confirms with the fundamental values or 
principles of the Constitution.210  
However, the above discussion does not mean that the rules of interpretation 
are no longer relevant. It should be emphasised that they now play a secondary role 
in the process of interpretation.211  
3.7. Is there order of primacy? 
Professor Du Plessis note that in South Africa, it appears that interpreters of fiscal 
legislation (judicial officers, practitioners and academics) tend to arrange the rules of 
interpretation in a mostly inarticulate, hierarchical order of primacy.212 In interpretive 
reasoning the justificatory weight of any specific canon of construction derives from 
its ranking in this order of primacy, which also tends to determine the manner and 
sequence in which canons are invoked in course of interpretive endeavours.213 
The canons of interpretation which express the paramountcy of the intention 
of the legislature in interpretation of fiscal statutes, as well as the pre-eminence of 
(clear and unambiguous) language in conveying that intention, rank highest in the 
order of primacy.214 Other less primary (or more secondary), lower-level canons of 
                                                
208 G Goldswain ‘Winds of Change III: The Constitution- A catalyst for Change’ (2009) 23 Tax Panning 
69-71 at 69 
209 Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizaberth Prison 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE) 597G-H 
210 See C Rautenbach et el Politics, Socio-Economic Issues and Culture in Constitutional Adjudication 
(2004) 14 
211 Ibid Fanyana ka Mdumbe at 475 
212 L Du Plessiss ‘The (Re-) Systematization of the Cannons of and Aids to Statutory Interpretation’ 
(2005) 122 3 SALJ 591-613 at 591 
213 Ibid  
214 Ibid Du Plessis (2005) 122 3 SALJ 591-613 at 592 
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construction may be invoked only in instances where the language of a provision lets 
an interpreter down (because it is vague or ambiguous, for instance).215 
However, the canons of interpretation are non-hierarchical in nature. 
Interpretation is determined by interpreters, as shall be discussed in the next chapter. 
Meaning is not discovered in a text, but is made in dealing with the text.216  
There is a view that not all canons of interpretation are legal rules, for 
instance, Wiechers argues that the (common law) rules of statutory interpretation are 
not really legal rules, but they are grounds of deduction on which the courts rely 
when they interpret statutes (fiscal), in other words, recognised process of thinking 
which a court will probably follow, although not obliged to do so.217 In contrast, the 
presumptions of statutory interpretation are, according to Wiechers, common law 
legal rules.218 
Du Plessis qualifies the above view when he notes that it is not significant to 
decide whether all or only some of the canons of interpretation are legal rules.219  All 
these canons do carry interpretive weight- how much (rightly or wrongly) depends 
on each one’s ranking in the conventional order of primacy.220 Moreover, the canons 
of construction form part of either the common law or legislation that ‘every court, 
tribunal or forum’ must interpret and develop in a manner promoting the ‘spirit, 
purport and objective of the Bills of Rights’.221 The Constitution does not rank the 
common law with any order of primacy. 
3.8. The Anti-Avoidance Transactions and Section 80A(c)(ii) of the 
Income Tax Act 
It has been said that the most controversial issues in tax law interpretation arise in the 
context of tax avoidance transactions.222  Every day, taxpayers structure transactions 
so as to minimise tax liability. The question is: when does this activity cease being 
                                                
215 Ibid 
216 L Du Plessis The Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 7-9 and 99-100 
217 Marinus Wiechers Administratiefreg 2ed (1984) 42-45 
218 Ibid 
219 Ibid Du Plessis (2005) 122 3 SALJ 591-613 at 593 
220 M Wiechers Administratiefreg 2ed (1984) 128-129 
221 See section 39(2) of the Constitution 
222 V Thuronyi Comparative Tax Law (2003) 133 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
32 
legitimate tax minimization and become tax avoidance which the law prohibits?223 
The tax avoidance transactions are contained in the general anti-avoidance rule 
which was enacted in section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended 
(the Income Tax Act). This section was repealed by section 36(1)(a) of the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act224 and replaced by a new general anti-avoidance rule, sections 
80A to 80L, which targets the impermissible tax avoidance arrangements.225 Section 
80A identifies four requirements to determine whether an arrangement is an 
impermissible tax avoidance arrangement namely: 
a. An avoidance arrangement is entered into or carried out, 
b. It results in a tax benefit, 
c. Any one of the following ‘tainted elements’ is present: 
• Abnormality regarding means, manner, right or obligations; 
• A lack of commercial substance in whole or in part and 
• Misuse or abuse of the provisions the Income Tax Act. 
d. The sole main aim is to obtain a tax benefit. 
The misuse or abuse requirement is contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the 
Income Tax Act. The concept of misuse or abuse is new to South African income tax 
environment.226 According to the Revised Proposals on Tax Avoidance and section 
103 of the Income Tax Act, the rationale behind the insertion of section 80A(c)(ii) 
was to reinforce the modern approach to the interpretation of tax statutes ‘in order to 
find the meaning that harmonizes the wording, spirit and purpose of the provisions of 
the Income Tax Act’.227 However, it seems that the section is self-serving for 
SARS.228 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill of 
2006 states that the legislature relied on, among others, the Canadian precedent in 
introducing the ‘misuse or abuse’ concept.229 Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax 
                                                
223 Ibid 
224 21 of 2006 
225 L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys ‘Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax Act and the Interpretation 
of Tax Statutes in South Africa’ (2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 at 167 
226 Ibid at 168 
227 South African Revenue Services (SARS) ‘Tax Avoidance and section 103 of the Income Tax Act: 
Revised Proposal’ (2006) Available at http://www.sars.co.za. [Accessed on 10 August 2011] 
228 The spirit of tax law is, of course, what SARS think it should be. 
229 Ibid L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys(2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 at 168 
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Act seem to have its roots from the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule, which is 
contained in section 245 of the Canadian Federal Income Tax Act of 1985.230 The 
Canada Trustco Mortgage Company231case is regarded as the leading case on section 
245(4) of the Canadian Income Tax Act232 which provides a basis for distinguishing 
between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance.233 
As stated above, section 80A(c)(ii)’s rationale is to reinforce the modern 
approach (the purposive and contextual approaches) to the interpretation of tax 
statutes. This entails that the modern approach is already authoritative is South 
Africa as discussed above. ‘Reinforce’ implies strengthening or supporting an 
existing concept or structure.234 This begs the following question: Does section 
80A(c)(ii) strengthen (increase) or support (maintain) the modern approach?235  
Van Schalkwyk and Geldenhuys viewed that section 80A(c)(ii) of the Income 
Tax Act does not require the court to look for some inner and spiritual meaning in 
the legislation that will not become apparent in a normal contextual and/or purposive 
approach to the interpretation of tax statutes. The section, thus, does not ‘strengthen’, 
but merely ‘support’ the modern approach to the interpretation of tax statutes in 
South Africa.236 However, this just begs the question as to what the purpose of the 
provision is. 
Section 80A(c)(ii) is crucial to the operation of section 80A since it applies 
both to situations ‘in the context of business’ and situations ‘in a context other than 
business’.237 Cilliers indicates that this section can be described as, ‘the heart of 
section 80A’.238 The section can be utilised against any avoidance arrangement 
presumed by SARS to directly or indirectly misuse or abuse any of the provisions of 
                                                
230 C Cilliers ‘Thou Shall not Peep at thy Neighbour’s Wife: Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax Act and 
the Abuse of Rights’ (2008) The Taxpayer 85-92 at 86, see also D Clegg and R Stretch Income Tax in 
South Africa (2007) 26 at para 3.5 and also A De Koker SILKE on South African Income Tax (2007) 19.7 
231 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SCC 54 at para 54  
232 R.S.C 1985, c.1 
233 Ibid De Koker at 19.7 see also D Meyerowitz et al ‘Tax Avoidance: Section 80A(c)(ii)’ (2007) The 
Taxpayer 147 
234 The New Oxford Dictionary of English (2001) 1565 
235 Ibid L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys(2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 at 170 
236 Ibid at 183 
237 Ibid   
238 Ibid C Cilliers (2008) The Taxpayer at 85-86 
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the Income Tax Act.239 This could lead to implications to taxpayers and tax officers 
in South Africa notably; in order to avoid section 80A(c)(ii), taxpayers could be 
required to adhere to a purposive theory when construing the provisions they rely 
upon. Similarly, when contemplating the application of section 80A(c)(ii) , tax 
officers could be obliged to base ‘misuse or abuse’ allegations on a purposive theory. 
240 Nevertheless, the purposive theory itself can easily lead to begging the question of 
what the purpose is. 
But, is a legislative authority (section 80A(c)(ii)) to reinforce the modern 
approach necessary in South Africa? Fortunately, this question is answered in 
affirmative because, first, the modern approach to the interpretation of tax statutes is 
inherently embedded in the Income Tax Act. This is so because the definition section 
of the Income Tax Act (section 1) contains the following proviso; ‘unless the context 
otherwise indicates’. 241 However, regardless of the above, it is doubtful whether the 
proviso to the definition section of the Income Tax Act can serve as a legislative 
authority for applying the modern approach to the interpretation of tax statutes.  
Moreover, the definition section in the Income Tax Act, and even other fiscal 
statutes, had always been there and it shows that the so-called modern approach is 
not so modern after all. 
Second, a legislative authority is necessary in South Africa because of the 
effect of the Constitution. As highlighted above, the Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic and is superior to all other legislation. Section 39(1) of the 
Constitution gives specific instructions on how to interpret the Bill of Rights. Section 
39(2) deals with the interpretation of any other legislation. These sections command 
a similar interpretive approach to both the Constitution and other statutes. In effect, 
constitutional interpretation determines and shapes statutory interpretation.242 
 
 
                                                
239 Ibid Meyerowitz et al (2007) The Taxpayer at 160, see also Davis Dennis, Olivier L, Urquhart G, 
Ferreira P and Roeleveld J Juta’s Income Tax (2007) 80G-I 
240 Ibid L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys(2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 at 173 
241 See L van Schalkwyk and B Geldenhuys(2009) 17 2 Meditary Accountancy Research 167-185 at 177 
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CHAPTER 4: THE COURTS, ‘VEIL PIERCING’ 
4.1. The continued dominance of the literal/textual approach 
In practice, the state of play in the South African judiciary is different and it is 
interesting. There is a continued dominance of the literal approach in South African 
courts despite being regarded as an orthodox approach. This is so because the courts 
deviate from the so-called ‘plain meaning’ of the text only if it is unclear or 
ambiguous, and the eventual application of the other rules of interpretation depends 
on how clear the text may seem to the particular interpreter.243 Even so, sometimes 
an ambiguity lies more in the mind of the judge than in the ‘literal’ language of a 
statute.244 
Recent case law also shows the continued dominance of the literal approach. 
The words of Zulman J in Welch’s Estate v Commissioner, SARS245 is instructive to 
this regard. The leaned judge viewed that, it is incorrect to ‘generalise about the 
intended reach of revenue legislation. Its reach must be determined by the language 
which the Legislature has chosen to express its will.’ In addition, in its comments on 
statutory interpretation, the court in the case of Commissioner, SARS v Executor 
Frith’s Estate246 stated that the primary rule in construction of statutory provision is 
to ascertain the intention of the legislature and this is achieved, in the first instance, 
by giving words their ordinary grammatical meaning. 
The reluctance of the courts to abandon the literal approach to interpretation 
of statutes was also figured in the Standard Bank Corp247 case where, in responding 
to the contentio  that the literal rule was on fade, the court held that, ‘[m]indful of 
the fact that the primary aim of statutory interpretation is to arrive at the intention of 
the legislature, the purpose of a statutory provision can provide a pointer to such 
interpretation where there is ambiguity.’ In this regard, the court viewed that the 
                                                
243 Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 3ed (1998) 30, see also J De Ville 
‘Meaning and Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373-389 at 377 
244 See D Meyerowitz ‘Has the Contra Fiscum Rule Vanished?’ (1995) 58 334 Acta Juridica 79-88 at 88 
245 2005 (4) SA 173 (SCA) at 186 
246 2001 (2) SA 261 (SCA) at 273 para 2 
247 Sandard Bank Corporation v Competition Commission 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) at para 21 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
36 
purpose and the context of legislation becomes relevant when the literal meaning of 
words has failed to establish the intention of the legislature.248 
Moreover, the courts’ faith in the literal approach was also expounded in the 
East London Municipality v Abrahamse249, where Harms JA, writing for the 
majority, had this to say about interpretation: ‘Interpretation concerns the meaning of 
the words used by the Legislature and it is therefore useful to approach the task by 
referring to the words used, and to leave extraneous considerations for later.’  More 
resilience was also shown in the Public Carriers Association250 case where 
Smallberger JA stated that, ‘the notion of what is known as a “purposive approach” 
is not entirely alien to our law.’ Instead, Smallberger JA preferred to follow the 
literal interpretation approach as being entrenched in South African law and he 
sought not to challenge it.251 
4.2. Rationale for the literal/textual approaches’ resilience 
The main justification for the continued dominance of the literal approach is the 
effect of the judicial precedent doctrine. This doctrine is also called the doctrine of 
stare decisis and it entails that a decision established in a previous judgement is 
binding upon a lower court, and that courts of equal rankings must follow their own 
previous decisions.252 Judges and magistrates in lower courts, if they encounter a 
case resembling previous cases, in facts or by rule of law, they are confident that it 
will be decided the same way. The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal are not forced to adhere to their own precedents, but it is rare not to do so.253 
Case by case, judges ‘weave the seamless web of the law from the thread of 
previous cases; the basic structure, the fundamental principles, remain the same.’254 
Like relay, the literal/textual approach’s baton stick is passed on from one judge to 
another, from court to court, whether higher or lower. This justifies the continued 
existence of the literal approach in the judiciary. In as much as the Constitution 
favours the purposive approach, the roots of the literal approach are still spreading in 
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the South African judiciary because they are embedded in case law precedents. The 
very precedents followed by the judiciary in the Republic are the very case law 
containing the ‘virus’, the literal/textual approach. It is impossible to imagine South 
African law without the doctrine of stare decisis and the literal/textual approach; they 
are firmly rooted in its history and practice. 
4.3. The ‘Common sense approach’ or the ‘judicial/free approach’ 
It has been said above that if the intention of the legislature is not expressed, there is 
a casus omissus255 which cannot be supplied by the courts whose sole duty is to 
interpret the Act as it stands.256  Judges do not create the law but they interpret the 
law.257 Since the law is to be found in texts, the job of the interpreter is to dig out the 
meanings placed in those texts by their authors. The interpreter (judges), thus find the 
law others have written, and do not make it.258 
However, in practice, ‘the interpreters of a law are not really constrained by 
legal language, precedents, rules, doctrines or principles, because these are not the 
reins of a horse that could control the reader’s behaviour. They are more like artist’s 
materials which the interpreter uses to create meanings.’259 The naked truth is that 
judges do make the law and they use their common sense to interpret legislation. In 
the case of WJ Fourie Beleggings v Commissioner of the South African Revenue 
Services,260 Leach AJA held that ‘although common sense had been described as 
“that most blunt of intellectual instruments”, it remained the most useful tool for 
deciding whether an amount was of a capital or of a revenue nature.’ The discussion 
below assumes a high level of competence and integrity on the part of tax judges. 
Professor Benson in his book The Interpretation Game: How judges and 
Lawyers make the Law viewed that, judges and lawyers do make the law and that 
they do not follow the rules of interpretation.261 With this, Benson noted that: 
                                                
255 A matter or contingency not catered for in the Act 
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... interpreters never discover the meaning of a law by finding the “holding” 
of a case, the “literal words” of a document, the “legislative intent” of a 
statute, or the “original intent”, “structure”, or “purpose” of a Constitution. 
These simply are not things that can be discovered like buried treasures. They 
are cultural fictions, rather like the Santa Claus myth, useful or not depending 
upon what the reader and society wish to do with them. 
The modern understanding of language and culture shows us that ‘meaning is 
not something that texts possess. It is something that interpreters [judges] produce 
and laws are no exception. The meaning of a law, whether it is a regulation, statute, 
case precedent, Constitution, contract, will or other legal document, does not reside 
in its text, but in the interpreters who give it meaning.’262 Thus interpretation is not, 
and cannot be, concerned with recovering an original meaning, since there is and was 
no original meaning. Meaning, instead, comes into being through an interaction 
between the text and the interpreter.263 
When judges interpret legislation, they purport to discover its meaning by 
reading the language of the text and to decipher the intention of the legislature. 
Judges work with texts whose wording was fixed in the past, but when reconstructing 
its meaning they draw current knowledge and their own understanding, experience 
and skills into consideration.264 They are both archaeologists (in theory) and artists 
(in practice) of the law. Archaeologists in that they locate meanings fixed in the past 
and artists in that they create new meanings to words.265  
Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates v Asher266 viewed that,  
[A] judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but he can 
and should iron out the creases. When a defect appears, a judge cannot just 
fold his hands and blame the draftsmen. He must set to work on the 
constructive task of finding the intention of the Parliament and then he must 
supplement the written words so as to give force and life to the intention of 
the Legislature. 
Over centuries, judges discovered bedrock principles of justice, the rights and 
duties required of human beings living in a complex society, and wove upon them 
the great webs of the common law of tax, torts, criminal and other areas of law, thus 
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an accomplishment of the judges alone in which the legislative and executive played 
little role.267 
In his post-script for lawyers, Professor Benson gave an interesting example 
when he said that, when a lawyer runs into a colleague who regales him with news of 
an interesting case he had just filed, the first question he will ask him is: ‘‘Who is the 
judge?”.268 This highlights the fact that the law depends upon the interpreter and 
judges are the interpreters, they determine the way any fiscal statute is to be 
interpreted. 
Judges in bona fidei, use ‘common sense’ when arriving at decisions and 
when interpreting legislations including fiscal legislation. Lord Atkins in Donoghue v 
Stevenson269 reiterated that, it is ‘an advantage to make it clear that the law ... is in 
accordance with sound common sense.’ In determining the various test used to 
inquire whether a particular receipt is one of revenue or capital nature, Friedman J in 
ITC 1450270 remarked that, ‘... one should not be led to a result in one’s classification 
of a receipt as income or capital which is, as I had occasion previously to remark, 
contrary to “sound commercial and good sense.”’ 
Moreover, In the determining whether the Pick ‘n Pay Trust had engaged in a 
profit making scheme in CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust271 case 
(leading case), Smalberger JA delivering the majority judgement of the court held 
that, on ‘ a common sense approach’ the Trust had not been carrying on a business of 
trading in shares. The activities of the Trust were therefore not part of a scheme of 
profit making.272 
Du Plessis273 view this approach as judicial activism. He argues that statutory 
interpretation is seen not as a science, but rather as an art that essentially involves 
making choices. Courts and other interpreters do not and cannot really rely on canons 
of construction to find the one and only correct or feasible meaning inherent in a text, 
but they do so to justify, explain and lend legitimacy to the interpretive outcome at 
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which they arrive. The interpretation outcome is predetermined by the interpreting 
judge’s pre-understanding.274 
The ‘common sense approach’ is embedded in the South African judiciary; a 
good example where the South African courts applied this approach is where they 
handled the issue of ‘apportionment’. The acceptable basis upon which an 
apportionment should be made is that which is ‘fair and reasonable.’ In SIR v 
Guardian Assurance Holdings275 case, the expenditure in question was apportioned 
on a ‘sensible basis’ which was held to be ‘logical and fair.’276  In the Tuck277 case, 
the court suggested apportionment on a 50/50 basis as fair and reasonable. 
The common sense approach is in line with the concept of reasonableness. 
Judges are reasonable persons; they use common sense during fiscal statute 
interpretation. A reasonable person does not have any extremes such as ‘Solomonic 
wisdom, prophetic foresight, chameleonic caution, headlong haste, nervous timidity 
or the agility of an acrobat’; he is just a person of ordinary prudence or has prudent 
common sense.278  
However, it is important to note that the above view does not deny the 
existence of the common law canons of interpretation but it inspires that, when 
‘sucking their judicial thumbs’, judges interpret fiscal statutes using their common 
sense. This entails that, if a literal/textual approach is appropriate or reasonable, 
judges considers it and they will apply it, and so is the purposive and contextual 
approach. Because the text being interpreted is legal, ordinary intuitions and common 
sense must be informed by these common law legal rules or principles.  
4.4. Rationale for the Common sense approach 
During interpretation, ‘interpreters (judges) have extraordinary licence, and are 
influenced by their own psychological character, values and personal contexts. In this 
sense, legal interpretation is subjective. It differs widely with individual 
                                                
274 Ibid Du Plessis at 126, see also De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 29-33 
275 1976 (4) SA 522 (A) at 533E-534A 
276 Ibid TS Emslie et al at 384 
277 CIR v Tucks 1988 (3) SA 819 (A)  at 835, see also TS Emslie et al Income Tax Cases and Material 3ed 
(2001) 287 
278 See Holmes JA in S v Burger 1975 (4) SA 877 (A) at 879E, see also Van Den Heever in Hershell v 
Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) at 490F 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
41 
personalities.’279 There are several reasons justifying the above view that judges 
determine interpretation of fiscal statutes without reference to the rules of 
interpretation but through their common sense. Inter alia, they are as follows: 
4.4.1. The nature and the shortcomings of the rules of interpretation 
It had been said above that the canons of construction are interpretive 
directives or way-marks which form part of the South African common law and they 
have no status as legal rules. They are just conceptual models applied by judges and 
others interpreters grappling with the meaning of particular legislative provisions.280 
Failure to ‘follow’ or ‘apply’ a rule of statutory interpretation is not an appealable or 
reviewable error. 
Professor Benson viewed that the intrinsic cannons of interpretation are too 
contradictory and enigmatic to be called rules, and are ignored as often as they are 
used by the courts because one [judge] to the other can apply them and justify any 
result they would like to reach.281 He compared them to proverbs and aphorisms: 
there seem to be wise advice in them for every situation, but nothing can one really 
pin down, and nothing can one have to pay attention to if he/she does not want.282 
What and whose context or purpose? How does someone define the borders 
of purpose/context from various purposes or contexts? Similar interpreters will arrive 
at different purposes when they construe the same provision. Contexts are boundless, 
it can never be determined fully in advance within which contexts a statutory 
provision will in future be applied (for example history, present circumstances, parts 
of the statutory texts, the Constitution).283 Botha notes that the purpose of the 
legislation appears to be nothing but a metaphor for the thoughts of the author.284 The 
purposive approach seems to suppress the contra fiscum rule.285 The short comings 
of the strict literal approach to the interpretation of fiscal statutes had been dealt up 
with in chapter 3 above.  
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The rules of interpretation had been said that they ‘hunt in pairs’, as stated 
above, in that for every rule pointing in one direction there is sure to be another 
pointing in some other direction (for every canon, there is a counter).286 If the literal 
approach or the ordinary meaning supports one outcome, while the 
purposive/contextual approach support another, the interpreter rely on his or her 
judgement to decide which outcome is better.  
In Pyott case287, it has been said that anomalies should, if possible, be 
avoided in the construction of a tax statute. But this is not always possible, because 
whatever canon of interpretation is adopted, there will be anomalies.288 Centlivres 
AJA, as then he was, stated that, 
If the words “any tax” at the beginning of section 8 (of the then Income Tax 
Act) are given their ordinary grammatical meaning they would include both 
the personal and provincial income tax; whether these words are construed 
literally or restrictively anomalies arise....289 
The canons of construction exaggerate the degree to which the intention of 
the legislature may be discovered from the words of a statute and they at times 
misled presiding officers when construing fiscal statutes.290  A good example of such 
dilemma is portrayed in The Taxpayer, where Davis commented that when the design 
and purpose lying behind a taxing statute is to raise revenue, to apply the purposive 
approach to language of the provisions of the Act which do not literally impose a 
liability for tax, holds the danger that the Courts may interpret a provision to fall 
within the design and purpose although the wording of the provision does not support 
the construction.291 
Furthermore, an approach of having regard to the design and purpose which 
lies behind the legislation could also have consequences of a Court making good a 
casus omissus where there appears to be no good reason for the statute not having 
dealt with the circumstance.292 It has been noted above that a tax Act deprives a 
taxpayer of portions of his funds and that the Act must clearly state the 
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circumstances in which the State may do so. There should be, however, as little as 
possible need to resort to the design and purpose of the Act to arrive at the taxpayer’s 
liability.293 
Moreover, the canons of interpretation also exaggerate both the certainty and 
the universality of the common law as a body of principles applicable, in the absence 
of statutes, to all possible cases.294 In addition, they minimise the possibility that the 
judge can, in his work of interpretation, fully use his common sense and reasonable 
analysis of each tax case at hand. 
4.4.2. Ever-changing process of interpretation 
Interpretation of legislation is ever-changing and so is fiscal legislation. 
Interpretation is a dynamic process, which can never be completed, since 
circumstances, perceptions, values and legislations always change. The Income Tax 
Act of South Africa had been repeatedly amended and repealed to the current one, 
even the current one is subject to yearly amendments.295 There can never be one final 
canon of interpretation cast in stone.296 
Honourable Sachs J explained this ever-changing process of interpretation in 
S v Mhlungu297 as follows: 
‘I regard the question of interpretation to be one to which there can never be 
an absolute and definite answer and that, in particular... how to balance out 
competing provisions, will always take the form of a principled judicial 
dialogue, in the first place between members of this Court [Constitutional 
Court], then between our Court and other Courts, the legal profession, law 
schools, Parliament, and indirectly, with the public at large.’ 
4.4.3. Judicial discretion 
Each case has its facts, which can influence the decision in a particular 
direction. It is believed that courts are the guardian of Constitutional rights and 
values, but not another super legislature. However where to draw the line during 
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interpretation and application is one of the vexing questions still facing courts.298 
Judicial discretion is the power of the courts to make some judicial decisions 
according to their discretion.299  This concept emerges from the doctrine of 
separation of powers which informs that the judicial is independent from the other 
spheres of the government, namely, the executive and the legislature.300   
The judicial authority of the South Africa is vested in the courts and they are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply 
impartially and without fear, favour and prejudice.301 No person or organ of the state 
may interfere with the functioning of the courts.302 The common sense approach is 
heavily inspired by judicial independence. Judges are free to express themselves 
without any other organ of the state intervening; so long it is intra vires. 
Had anyone ever wondered why judges split in deciding a case, rendering a 
majority versus a minority decision? It is also important to note that even when 
judges uses their own discretion, neither do they arrive at the same decision nor do 
they use similar rules of interpretation. This is so because they are not born by a 
single parent nor are they programmed computers, in short, they are different. They 
are not just different physically but in many respects; way of thinking or ideology, 
background, beliefs, values and so f rth. The case law has never been stable,303 there 
are rare cases held unanimously by judges in the South African tax law 
jurisprudence. Suited in their symbolic robes, the judges presiding in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein use different interpretive tools (chiefly common 
sense, though sometimes this is open to doubt) to reach certain (similar or different) 
conclusions upon interpretation of a similar tax statute (even a similar provision). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
With everything that has been said, this paper does not shy away from the conclusion 
that, in South African tax courts, the search for a unified theory of interpretation is a 
misguided quest and it is just a pipe dream because the rules of interpretation are just 
conceptual models applied by judges and others interpreters to justify their findings. 
Judges are the ones who determine how fiscal legislation must be construed and their 
determination differs from case to case. They, in creating meanings, have 
extraordinary license, and are inescapably influenced by their own psychological 
character, values and personal contexts. The ‘interpretation game’ will inevitably 
continue to pose vexed questions and, equally inevitably, result sometimes in vexed 
judicial ‘solutions’. 
Statutory interpretation is not, and can never been, a judicial science- it will 
remain a patchwork of different approaches. The best that one can hope for is that the 
scope for interpretational surprises will narrow, but even this is probably too much to 
hope for. Judges do their best, but there is no such thing as a right or a one-and-only 
answer.  
The above discussion of case law and section 39(2) of the Constitution 
confirm that interpretation of fiscal legislation does not differ from the interpretation 
of other statutes. Judges are independent; it is not possible to predict with certainty 
how the courts might resolve a particular case and which rule of interpretation they 
are going to apply. Rules of statutory interpretation in each jurisdiction contain 
contradictory maxims, and because many situations require judgement, it is difficult 
to predict with certainty how a particular case will be decided. However, one can 
form a view as to probabilities. Such a view is informed by judicial style, judicial 
choice and judicial precedent. 
It is important to conclude that, in theory, the automatic application of the 
strict literal approach to the interpretation of fiscal legislation is no longer a viable 
option for the judiciary especially in cases where inequitable, unreasonable and 
unjust consequences arise as a result of applying such approach. However, in 
practice, courts still have faith in this approach and it is still being applied. In as 
much as the coming into effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 
1996, suggested the application of the purposive approach over the strict literal 
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approach, the literal rule is still the first port of inquiry used by the courts when 
interpreting fiscal statutes and if it result to absurdity, that is where the courts deviate 
from this rule. It is also important to note that there is no order of primacy within the 
application of the rules of interpretation, primacy is determined by interpreters and it 
differs from one another. 
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